In support of his United We Serve initiative, President Obama and NFL stars Drew Brees, DeMarcus Ware, and Troy Polamalu team up to highlight the importance of fitness for America’s children. The …

The disputes between the parties to this action were previously settled and dismissed by an order dated April 7, 2009. Following a reversal of the contempt findings against non-parties Richard F. Scruggs and the Scruggs Law Firm, P.A. by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Appeal Number 08-14716-DD, the remaining disputes have been settled between E. A. Renfroe & Company, Inc., and the above-referenced non-parties. Therefore, by and through their respective counsel of record, the undersigned do hereby jointly stipulate to the dismissal of all remaining issues and claims between them in this matter, with prejudice, each party to bear its own respective costs.

When the contempt findings issued by Judge Acker were vacated and remanded by Order of the 11th Circuit – 11th Circuit overturns Scruggs contempt citation! - the Court directed all remaining issues pertaining to Scruggs in the Renfroe case should be assigned to a different district court judge.  

Sharon Lovelace Blackburn, Chief United States Judge of the Northern District of Alabama, had the honor of shutting this boondoggle down – and did so in an Order issued November 10, 2009, the very same day the Joint Stipulation of Dismissal was filed:

Pursuant to that Stipulation, it is ORDERED that all remaining claims between plaintiff and the above-referenced non-parties are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Each party shall bear his or its own costs.

One could infer from the quick turn around of the Order that Judge Blackburn had read the most interesting footnote in the 11th’s Opinion and couldn’t wait to get this case out the door:

Indeed, the Rigsbys primary alleged contempt as detailed in the subsequent June 5th order consisted of their failure to adequately demand return of the documents from Scruggs, an act he could not possibly have aided and abetted.

Noooo, he could not; but, OMG, it took the 11th Circuit to figure that out  because  Judge Acker had wigged out.  He was  still wiggin’ in July when he posted this Notice a week to the day after the 11th’s Opinion was public:

The parties are hereby notified that, as promised, all documents in the possession of the court have been shredded. DONE this 28th day of July, 2009.

Honestly, the “as promised” makes Acker seem a bit disappointed that no one claimed the documents he spent gadzooks of taxpayer money protecting.  Likely he’ll be even more disappointed to learn the Rigsby sisters didn’t steal anything from State Farm, if indeed he didn’t know it all along.

Pursuant to Rule 50, Fed. R. Civ. P., Plaintiff moves for judgment as a matter of law on all issues concerning contract damages on the grounds that the jury did not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find in favor of Defendant….

The law is clear that when considering a Rule 50 motion, “the Court must review all of the evidence from the record, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Poliner v. Texas Health Systems, 537 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2008).  While this standard is a heavy one, in the case sub judice the evidence presented at trial compelled a finding in favor of the Plaintiff. The jury’s contrary verdict should not be allowed to stand.

On blog and off, readers have consistently offered positive comments about Bossier’s counsel Judy Guice calling her an ethical, smart lawyer that fights for her clients. At least one has mentioned that putting clients first, not money, is what all lawyers are supposed to do.

Nothing is more telling of Guice’s client-first commitment to the practice of law than the Motion for Judgment As A Matter of Law or in the Alternative for a New Trial and the Memorandum of Support - both were filed Friday in Bossier v State Farm and followed by a relatedOrder from Judge Senter.

Guice’s Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law put a compelling argument on the table:

Defendant bore the burden of proving that all of Plaintiff’s dwelling loss beyond that which had previously been paid resulted from storm surge flooding. It failed to carry this burden. Indeed, Defendant failed to offer a qualified expert witness on the issue of causation. Under Mississippi law, only a licensed professional engineer can give opinions concerning causation, yet Defendant failed to present any. See, Miss. Code Ann. § 73-13-1, et .seq.

The evidence was uncontradicted that high winds totally destroyed Plaintiff’s 1,000 square foot dwelling extension prior to the arrival of storm surge flooding on the property. This dwelling extension was located in close proximity to Plaintiff’s dwelling. The side of Plaintiff’s dwelling closest to the dwelling extension was completely missing. Professional engineer Ted Biddy testified that he personally observed that the east wall closest to the dwelling extension was blown in by winds.

Moreover, Defendant admitted that Plaintiff’s entire roof and parts of the exterior required replacement. Yet Defendant paid nothing for interior damage that would have occurred and offered no proof that the sole cause of such damage was excluded from storm surge. Defendant offered only photographs and unsubstantiated adjuster conclusions concerning the cause of loss. The photographs, however,demonstrated substantial upper level damage to the home, including soffit and fascia damage and roof damage that was well above the waterline.

State Farm representative Tip Pupua admitted that even afer adjusting the loss amount for paying only for a 25 year roof, State Farm erred again and paid only for a 30 year roof. Pupua admitted State Farm owed Plaintiff additional monies for a 40 year roof yet the jury ignored this uncontradicted testimony.

Proof also established that Plaintiff’s south side of the dwelling was completely encased in windows. The entire wall of windows was missing following the storm. Defense witnesses readily conceded that they did not and could not determine that none of the windows had been broken by wind.

The text that follows, no doubt, accounts for State Farm’s relative silence:

This Honorable Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law after Defendant’s presentation of the evidence, but noted during the jury instruction conference that the motion probably should have been granted. While the Court permitted the case to go to the jury, it may, and should now, order judgment as a matter of law.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2008), supports grant of the Rule 50 motion in this case. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit’s reversal of this Honorable Court’s JMOL in Broussard was based solely on the testimony of State Farm’s expert witnesses who “testified that the damage to the actual structure of the Broussards’ home came from the storm surge.” Id. at 625. No such evidence was presented here. JMOL is appropriate in this case.

After Broussard, Judge Senter deciding to send the case to the jury was an understandable decision – particularly when the evidence was so clearly in Bossier’s favor as further demonstrated in the discussion of the alternative, a new trial:

In the alternative, the Court should grant a new trial as to all issues under Rule 59. Again, the standard is a familiar one. Specifically, a new trial may be granted when the verdict is “against the great [weight], not merely the preponderance, of the evidence.” Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d 982, 986 (5th Cir. 1989).

Of course, “the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, and the verdict must be affirmed unless the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary [conclusion].’” Id. at 987 (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc)).

Here, the evidence was overwhelmingly in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff presented eyewitness testimony of Joseph Ziz who observed the substantial dwelling extension being destroyed by wind prior to the arrival of storm surge,flooding. Moreover, Plaintiff presented multiple claims file information of neighboring properties where engineers hired by State Farm found evidence of heavy wind damage in the area.

Plaintiff also presented the only professional engineer to testify at trial. This uncontradicted testimony was that the damage to Plaintiff’s home resulted from the winds of Hurricane Katrina.

In contrast, Defendant presented only photographs and conclusory lay opinion testimony from poorly trained and unqualified adjusters. The only expert witness presented by Defendant confirmed that the winds of Hurricane Katrina would have impacted Plaintiff’s property prior to excluded flood waters. State Farm wholly and utterly failed to meet its burden of proving that all or any of the unpaid damage to Plaintiff’s home was caused by storm surge.

Stated differently, Defendant failed to prove that none of the damage to Plaintiff’s home was caused by wind prior to the arrival of storm surge flooding. The evidence was so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of Plaintiff that a new trial should and must be granted.

In addition, there exists in this case evidence of confusion on the part of the jury. During the jury’s deliberation on the punitive damages claim, a note was sent to the Court asking why Plaintiff did not have flood insurance. This was obviously an issue that was on the jury’s mind, although it had no relevance as to any issue in this case, whether punitive or compensatory damages.

Further confusion of the jury was evident when the jury was polled and juror number 1 vacillated as to whether the verdict read was in fact her verdict.

As compelling as the Memorandum is up to this point, the seal-the-deal text follows:

Plaintiff also submits that a new trial is required because of the erroneous form of the jury verdict during the compensatory damages phase of the trial.

While the Court’s instructions to the jury properly placed the burden of proving an exclusion to coverage on State Farm and advised the jury that Plaintiff had met his burden of proving that the dwelling damage was caused by an accidental direct physical loss and the personal property by windstorm, the jury verdict form was in conflict with said instructions and required the jury to find that the cause of loss was covered. In this regard, the jury verdict provided as follows:

The verdict form relating to the dwelling required the jury to find the damage was caused by wind, in effect negating the Court’s previous instructions that Plaintiff had met his burden of proof. Similarly, as to contents, while the Court had previously advised the jury that the contents were covered as caused by windstorm, the jury verdict form required the jury to find the loss was caused by windstorm. Thus, the jury verdict form, in conjunction with the instructions, produced a hopeless conflict concerning the burden of proof.

The last item entered on the docket Friday was an Order from Judge Senter noting:

My ruling, consistent with this opinion, is already a matter of record. The ruling I made from the bench has been formalized in opinion this 20th day of November, 2009.

The ruling was Senter’s decision on the testimony of Forrest Masters, retained by State Farm to testify as an expert in the field of engineering:

The Court has before it the plaintiff’s ore tenus motion to exclude the testimony of Forrest James Masters (Masters), one of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company’s (State Farm) expert witnesses. State Farm has retained Masters to testify as an expert in the field of engineering.

Masters is extensively educated, holding a Ph.D. in civil engineering. He meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in that he is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to testify in the form of an opinion on engineering issues.

Plaintiff’s objection to the admissibility of Masters’s testimony is not in the nature of a Daubert challenge nor is it based upon any alleged inadequacy in Masters’s engineering education, training, or expertise. If the plaintiff’s objection were based on the holding in Daubert, or on Masters’s qualifications as an expert under Rule 702, I would overrule the objection and allow Masters to testify.

The plaintiff’s challenge is not, however, grounded in Daubert or in the question of Masters’s education, training, or expertise. Plaintiff challenges Masters’ competency under Mississippi law, specifically §73-13-1, et seq. and the regulations enacted under these statutes. These state laws require that a professional engineer be certified in order to practice engineering in Mississippi, and these same statutes define the practice of engineering to include giving testimony as an expert in the field of engineering.

I am duty bound to follow Mississippi law in determining the competency of all witnesses in this diversity action. Federal Rules of Evidence 601 provides:

Rule 601. General Rule of Competency
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State
law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness
shall be determined in accordance with State law.

This is a diversity action. Therefore, both Rule 601 and Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to Masters’s testimony, and the requirements of both rules must be met if Masters is to testify as an expert in this action. Not only must Masters be qualified as an expert under Rule 703, he must also be competent to testify as an expert in engineering under Mississippi law.

To put it in its simplest terms, the plaintiff asserts that Masters is statutorily disqualified from testifying in this case because he lacks the requisite certification as a professional engineer under Mississippi law. Plaintiff correctly points out that testifying as an expert in the field of engineering is within the definition of “practicing engineering” and therefore requires a Mississippi certificate of registration.

Masters is not licensed or certified as an engineer in Mississippi, nor is he licensed or certified as a practicing engineer in any other state. Masters is qualified as an engineer intern in Florida, and he earns his living primarily as an engineering teacher. The question before the Court is whether his lack of certification under Mississippi law as a professional engineer disqualifies him from testifying in this action under 73-13-1 et seq. and Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Based on my review of the statutes and regulations on which the plaintiff relies, I agree with the plaintiff’s contention that giving expert testimony as an engineer is within the statutory definition of practicing engineering. Miss. Code Ann. §73-13-3. If the statute and regulations are to be honored, Masters must be disqualified as an expert in this case on the grounds that allowing his testimony in the absence of certification or a Regulation 4.05 certificate is inconsistent with Mississippi substantive law made binding on this Court in all diversity cases under Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

It would be my preference to allow Masters to testify were that option open under Mississippi law. The competing interest in this matter is the very important right of a party to present reliable evidence in support of its position. Defendant asserts that the statute and regulations impose an undue or unreasonable restriction on the Court’s control of evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

This is not the first time this issue has arisen in the context of Hurricane Katrina litigation. In Aiken v. Rimkus, Civil Action No. 1:06cv741 LTS-RHW (Aiken), I excluded the substantive testimony of an expert engineer for his failure to meet the requirements imposed by §73-13-1 et seq. In Aiken, I attempted to ameliorate the effect of the statute by permitting the engineer in question to testify to establish the standard of care in his field, finding that this did not infringe the statutory restrictions. It proved impossible, however, to completely separate testimony concerning the standard of care from the forensic question whether that standard of care had been met. The importance of the Aiken case, from the Court’s point of view, is that it serves to give fair notice to the litigants and attorneys in Katrina cases that the statute and regulations at issue will be honored…

Judge Senter then recounts the cases he reviewed to guide his opinion before moving to a related review of the way other circuits have ruled on the important point of law the plaintiff has raised:

The matter before me is not an issue of admissibility concerning documentary evidence: it is an issue of the competency of an expert witness in this diversity case, an issue governed by Rule 601. This is a diversity action in which the substantive law of Mississippi applies…

There exists a split in authorities among the circuits on the question whether Rule 702 displaces Rule 601 in determining the competency of expert witnesses. The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits apply Rule 601. Legg v. Chopra, 286 F.3d 286, 289-92 (6 Cir.2002) (applying Tennessee th law); Higgenbottom v. Noreen, 586 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1978) (applying Oregon law); McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1287, 1294-95 (11th Cir.2004) (applying Georgia law). The First, Fourth, and D.C.Circuits appear to rely on Rule 702 alone. Garbincius v. Boston Edison Co., 621 F.2d 1171, 1173 (1st Cir.1980); Bryte ex rel. Bryte v. Am. Household, Inc., 429 F.3d 469,475-76 (4th Cir.2005); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 897 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C.Cir.1990).

I find that the requirements of Rule 702 and Rule 601 are cumulative. An expert must meet both the competency requirements of state law and the standard of qualification under Rule 702 and Daubert. I have identified no Fifth Circuit case that addresses this specific issue. Among the existing authorities, I find the cases that follow both the competency requirements of Rule 601 and the qualification requirements of Rule 702 persuasive.

Accordingly, I find Rule 601 applicable. Following the dictate of Rule 601, I find that Mississippi law governs the competency of Masters to testify as an expert in the field of engineering. I further find that Masters’ lack of the certification required by Miss. Code Ann. §73-13-1 et seq. and the regulations thereunder disqualify him from giving expert testimony concerning engineering issues in this case.

In light of Judge Senter’s reference to Aiken as giving fair notice to the litigants and attorneys in Katrina cases that the statute and regulations at issue will be honored, State Farm does not appear to have a leg to stand on. In fact, the Company has been requesting additional time to identify experts in a number of cases.

The Justice Department announced Thursday that it had secured nearly $2 billion from lawsuits filed under the False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions in the year ending Sept. 30. And it promised to do more. Tony West, assistant attorney general for the civil division, said in a statement, “Rooting out fraud and safeguarding taxpayers from illegal conduct are among the Justice Department’s highest priorities.”

Given the importance being placed on False Claims Act cases, a decision out of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals (pdf) on Wednesday should take on greater significance, especially for parties that end up settling but don’t admit to any wrongdoing. (To us, that seems to be pretty much everybody.) The 9th Circuit ruled that the False Claims Act does not preclude a settling defendant from seeking recovery and bringing claims against a third party for its alleged violations. h/t CLS

Yoo hoo, down here Mr. West, we’re waiting for you to walk that talk and join the Rigsby qui tam.  Meanwhile, Law.com has more on the 9th Circuit decision.

The case before the appeals court involved a company called Cell Therapeutics Inc., which developed a drug to treat leukemia that the Food and Drug Administration approved in 2000. But the company also marketed the drug for other uses, and a whistleblower at CTI sued the company on behalf of the government, claiming that CTI was ripping off Medicare. CTI eventually settled the case with the government and the whistleblower for $10.5 million, but it did not admit any wrongdoing.

Along the way, CTI sued a consultant outfit known today as the Lash Group, which advised CTI on what uses of the drug were reimbursable by Medicare. But the district court threw the case out, concluding that qui tam defendants could not bring such cases. The 9th Circuit reversed that decision, finding that the settlement did not preclude CTI from pursuing claims against third parties.

“Expanding the effect of a settlement to bar independent claims against third parties of claims for indemnification or contribution apart from FCA liability would inevitably tip the equation toward trial rather than settlement, even where settlement would be in the best interest of the parties,” wrote Judge Margaret McKeown for the court. “The bottom line is that a settlement agreement under the FCA should not, absent specific and clearly identified intent to the contrary, be viewed as an admission of liability that precludes non-FCA claims against third parties.”

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe partner Daniel Dunne, who argued the case for CTI, hailed the decision, according to The Associated Press. “For the first time here, the Ninth Circuit has now swept away the rationale for all of that law,” said Dunne. “That’s a very important development. With hundreds of billions of dollars of stimulus money being sprinkled across the country, you can expect qui tam lawsuits to be a growth industry.

Something to think about over this football weekend -  when it comes to rooting out fraud in the insurance industry, the only play we’ve seen from Justice is a punt!

As reported in Now, about that document State Farm produced for Judge Senter in Rigsby qui tam, Coast attorney Deborah Trotter of the Merlin Law Group is counsel for plaintiff’s in three similar cases currently before the Court, Judge Senter presiding.  Magistrate Judge Parker was assigned Lizana v State Farm and Magistrate Judge Walker the other two, Lebon v State Farm, and New Light Baptist Church v State Farm:

Defendant simultaneously filed three motions for protective order in response to Plaintiff’s Notices of 30(b)(6) Depositions, one of which was an expedited motion to quash and for protective order, for which the Lebon Court ordered Plaintiff on November 9, 2009, to Respond by 9:00am on November 10, 2009, during Hurricane Ida Warnings. As all three motions filed simultaneously by Defendant were similar in substance, context and argument, with the exception of the additional motion to quash in the Lebon case, Plaintiff’s counsel determined that in the interest of judicial economy and consistency that all should be responded to simultaneously and in combination. (Plaintiff’s Amended Response, Lizana)

Plaintiffs’ notices were filed simultaneously but State Farm’s motions were cleverly staggered:

• October 30: Lizana, Lebon and New Light Baptist Church plaintiffs each file Notice of 30(b)(6) IT Video Deposition and Issuance of Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum

• November 6: Lebon v State Farm: Motion to Expedite, Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Notice of 30(b)(6) IT Video Deposition and Issuance of Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum think and Motion for Protective Order by State Farm

• November 9:  New Light Baptist Church v State Farm: MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiff’s Notice of 30(b)(6) IT Video Deposition and Issuance of Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum by State Farm

• November 11: Lizana v State Farm: MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiff’s Notice of 30(b)(6) IT Video Deposition and Issuance of Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum by State Farm

Cleverly staggered – and cleverly planned to produce the following result:

• November 9: Walker issues Text Only Order granting State Farm’s Motion to Expedite with Plaintiff’s Response due at 9:00am the next day! (Note November 9 is the same day State Farm filed its Motion for Protective Order in New Light Baptist Church v State Farm)

• November 18: Plaintiff files Amended Response in Lizana to correct and/or clarify title and references to defendant State Farm’s motion to quash and filed a similar amendment in both Lebon and New Light Baptist Church v State Farm to clarify and/or correct related references in the Response for these cases.

• November 19: Walker issues Order granting State Farm’s Motion to Quash the Lebon’s Notice of 30(b)(6) IT Video Deposition and Issuance of Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum and an additional Order declaring Protective Order Moot in both  New Light Baptist Church v State Farm as well as Lebon.

The timeline only suggests what the Orders reveal, namely that Judge Walker willingly ignored fact that would contradict his assumption:

The notices of deposition were served on October 30, 2009, with depositions scheduled for November 11 and 12, 2009. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs set the location, date and time for these depositions unilaterally and without consulting Defendant. Defendant further argues that it has not been given sufficient time to identify, coordinate with, and prepare a representative to speak on its behalf for the scheduled deposition.

The Court finds that Defendant’s motion to quash should be GRANTED and the notices of deposition quashed based on Plaintiff’s unilateral setting of the deposition, without consultation and without allowing sufficient preparation time for Defendant.

Not a word about Plaintiff’s argument and evidence to the contrary:

In Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to extend the discovery deadline and motion deadline is this case, Defendant showed the court the difficulties of scheduling
depositions across this country and beyond for very active deponents and experts. However, Defendant’s exhibits were very selective in its attempts to show that the scheduling difficulties were the result of something other than their very own obstructionist tactics of offering deposition dates only at the end of the discovery period, availability of requested deponents only in a certain time and/or place, or only within a week, or on some occasions, for only one day in a specific place. (See Composite Exhibit A.)

Further, without proper recognition of inherent difficulties in coordinating schedules, Defendant attempted to persuade the court that the inability to properly notice depositions was due
to something other than State Farm’s orchestrated efforts to hide the known whereabouts of the requested deponents listed in State Farm’s Initial Disclosures On February 4, 2009, this court scheduled twelve (12) case management conferences,including this case, between the two firms involved in this present action. This court scheduled the 12 cases in groups of three over a slightly staggered period. On March 30, 2009 during a Hearing with this court for an extension of time in two of those cases for Plaintiffs to respond to discovery, one Plaintiff was out of the country and the other was combating illness, State Farm sought a deposition schedule for Plaintiffs in those 12 cases, without regard to their schedules or circumstances. This court granted State Farm’s request which resulted in the deposition schedule attached as Exhibit D. The court offered that it would assist the Defendant in obtaining information necessary to resolve these cases. In respect for the ruling, Plaintiffs obliged.

Further, in August 2009, this court ordered several of those 12 cases into mediation. At one of the mediation, State Farm refused to even participate and refused to counter Plaintiff’s demand. So much for State Farm’s alleged efforts at resolving cases as alleged in its Response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ request for an extension. Plaintiffs requested deposition dates for requested deponents in this case in September 2009, only to receive deposition dates for late October and early November. The trial date in this matter is not until June 7, 2010. It is not necessary to allow only a three month period in which to depose no less than five experts designated by defendant, which five experts are located throughout the country and beyond.
Though, Plaintiffs have accomplished the depositions of the requested experts, the short discovery period does not allow for follow up to information discovered that would likely lead to
the admissible evidence as contemplated by Federal Rules 26.

Further, it is often in these depositions that a party discovers information withheld, not previously identified and/or in the possession of some other entity or source, such as that information requested of deponents from the Structures Group in this matter.(See Exhibit E, Good Faith Correspondence re Information to be Produced by the Structures Group.)
State Farm uses the recent cancellation of a deposition in Chicago to support its objection to an extension of the discovery deadline. However, State Farm fails to alert the court that the
Plaintiffs were forced to cancel the deposition scheduled in Chicago due to the approach of Hurricane Ida, to which counsel for State Farm was fully apprised. (See Exhibit F.) This deposition of an employee of State Farm who is in possession of relevant information to the Plaintiffs’ claims will not be allowed to be rescheduled without an extension of the discovery deadline.

Further, State Farm objects to Plaintiffs’ request for a discovery extension because it alleges that Plaintiffs have not conferred with Defendant regarding Plaintiffs’ requested 30(b)(6) deponents. However, Plaintiffs sent a detailed Notice with attached Topics of Inquiry as to alert Defendant to the areas that the Corporate Representative, or Person(s) Most Knowledgeable (PMK), should be prepared for testimony on behalf of State Farm. (See Exhibit G.) Further, Plaintiffs sent State Farm a very detailed basis for the relevancy and discoverability of all of the information and data requested from State Farm in Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, to which topics Plaintiffs also wantedState Farm’s 30(b)(6) deponent to be able to speak for the company.

Plaintiffs scheduled these 30(b)(6) deponents with reasonable notice, especially, given the fact that these areas of inquiry had been discussed in previous cases between the firms, and during recent depositions where opposing counsel advised that a 30(b)(6) witness would be made available for those types of inquiries that the sitting deponent was not authorized to answer.

However, the most egregious obstructionist tactics used by State Farm in this case is its arbitrarily ending the discovery period two weeks prior to the current deadline of November 16,
2009. Plaintiffs submit that the previously mentioned instances and these instance listed below, present good cause for an extension of the discovery deadline and the motion deadline in this case. On October 30, 2009, Plaintiffs sent its Notices for a 30(b)(6) deponent and a 30(b)(6) IT deponent. On November 5, 2009, after detailed correspondence identifying the topics of inquiry and the relevancy of the requested topics, State Farm filed emergency Motions to Quash the 30(b)(6) deponents depositions. (See Exhibit G) On November 9, 2009, the day of the hurricane warnings for Hurricane Ida, Plaintiffs were ordered by the court to respond to State Farm’s Expedited Motion to Quash by 9:00am on November 10, 2009. Plaintiffs filed their timely Response. However, on November 10, 2009, State Farm informed Plaintiffs that it would not be participating in the 30(b)(6) depositions scheduled. (See Exhibit H.) State Farm’s cancellation of the depositions is contrary to Uniform Local Rule 37.2 that states “The filing of a motion for protective order to limit or quash a deposition does not operate as a stay of the deposition. It is incumbent upon the party seeking the protection of the court to obtain a ruling on the motion prior to the scheduled deposition.” Plaintiffs will not be allowed to rescheduled these depositions without an extension of the discovery deadline.

On November 2, 2009, Plaintiffs sent detailed correspondence to State Farm identifying production of data and materials that the deponents, State Farm experts, The Structures Group, agreed to produced. (See Exhibit E.) Defendant has decided not to respond to at all and to force Plaintiffs to file a Motion to Compel the production. On November 6, 2009, Plaintiffs sent correspondence to State Farm seeking to obtain production of data and documents held at opposing counsel’s office and requested confirmation of November 11 – 14, 2009, as dates that Plaintiffs could have access to the data and information for inspection and copying as stated in State Farm’s discovery responses. (See Exhibit I.) Again, State Farm chose to continue its invoke its arbitrary discovery deadline by ignoring Plaintiffs requests and failing to respond at all.

State Farm should not be allowed to make a mockery of the judicial system by selectively applying portions of the Federal Rules and Local Rules to aid in their obstructionist tactics. Again, though, the Federal Rules and Local Rules allow for the inspection and copying of data and information, it also requires that the burden to shift the cost of production to another party be based upon proof that the production requested would in fact be burdensome. Also, to benefit from the rule that allows inspection and copying of voluminous materials, the party seeking protection from the burden of production must describe by category and location those documents in its possession, custody or control.

Walker’s Orders do nothing to dispute the growing consensus he’s a Company man to the core. Read the rest from the linked document – assuming you’re not sickened by what you’ve read thus far.

With the world watching what the spinmasters of the insurance industry called the great New Orleans Flood,  the preventable disaster delivered  a horror beyond words.

“Judge Duval exposed 40 years of the Army Corps of Engineers’ gross malfeasance with regard to the operation and maintenance of the MR-GO,” said Pierce O’Donnell, a Los Angeles-based attorney and co-leader of the plaintiff’s legal team. “His decision is an extreme condemnation of the lack of concern for the safety of New Orleans and St. Bernard residents.”

"Duval said he was 'utterly convinced' that the corps' failure to shore up the channel doomed the channel to grow to two to three times its design width" (CainBurdeau)

Duval’s decision is also a fascinating read – all 189 pages of his Findings of Fact and the two-page Judgment.

Continuing with Mark Schleifstein, writing for the Times Picayune, the decision…sets the  stage for judgments against the govenment for damages by as many as 100,000 other residents, businesses and local governments in those areas who filed claims with the corps after  Katrina.

If successful, the damage claims could total billions of dollars…

A Justice Department spokesman was not immediately available late Wednesday to respond to the ruling, but the government is expected to appeal the decision to the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, and then to the U.S. Supreme Court, if necessary…

“Until such time as the litigation is completed, including the appellate process up to and through the U.S Supreme Court, no activity is expected to be taken on any of these claims,” corps spokesman Ken Holder said.

Appealing Duval’s decision would be another man made disaster with “we the people” picking up the tab.  It’s time to say no!

Congressional hearings on the potential impeachment of U.S. District Judge Thomas Porteous of Metairie that begin today in Washington follow Porteous’ filing of a motion for TRO last Friday and a weekend whirlwind of legal documents flying back and forth before a federal court denied the motion yesterday.

The TRO motion and defendant’s response are among the linked documents that follow the brief background below.

Over the weekend, two readers sent links to the same story – one published in the Washington Post and the other in the Times Picayune - but anywhere you read the latest from Louisiana federal judge Thomas Porteous, it’s an incredible story:

A Louisiana federal judge sued a House impeachment task force Friday, contending the panel is making the case for his ouster by using testimony he gave under a promise of immunity.

U.S. District Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr. is under investigation for alleged misconduct, including an allegation that he accepted money from lawyers involved in a trial over which he presided.

The suit, in U.S. District Court, said the House task force violated Porteous’ Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. The task force used immunized testimony in witness interviews and to formulate strategy, the suit said.

Monday, a federal judge in Washington denied Judge Porteous’ motion.

A federal court refused Monday to issue a temporary restraining order to block the opening of congressional hearings today into the potential impeachment of U.S. District Judge Thomas Porteous of Metairie.

But Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia said attorneys for Porteous may still file for a preliminary injunction later this year, though he counseled that their chances for success are a “very, very long shot.”

Richard Westling, representing Porteous, said he will consult with his client and let the court know his decision Nov. 30.

Irvin Nathan, general counsel for the House of Representatives, argued against the temporary restraining order, saying that if Leon had granted it, it would have been the first time in history that a court had tried to block any kind of congressional hearing…

Nathan argued that the Justice Department long ago decided not to prosecute Porteous and that impeachment is explicitly not a criminal proceeding. It is also, he said, a congressional responsibility wholly beyond the power of the court.

Westling countered that impeachment is, in effect, a “quasi-criminal” proceeding that could lead to Porteous being removed from office and barred from holding future federal office. That would happen if the House impeaches Porteous and the Senate convicts him.

Leon told Westling there was “just no precedent” for his pleading that Porteous’ Fifth Amendment rights were being compromised in the impeachment proceedings. Westling replied that impeachment cases are very rare, and that he does not think there has ever been an impeachment case where immunized testimony was being used to help construct the case against the defendant.

Even without a temporary restraining order, Leon said, Porteous faces no imminent danger of lasting harm. While the House Judiciary Committee task force will hold its first hearings today and Wednesday on the Porteous case, Leon said the full House probably will not vote until the spring on whether to impeach Porteous and send his case to the Senate for trial.

Eight potential witnesses have been granted immunity to testify before the impeachment task force.

Before his appointment to the bench, Leon was counsel to Congress in the investigation of three sitting presidents, including in the Iran-Contra and Whitewater cases. He was nominated to the bench by President George W. Bush.

Some wonder if Congress is having flashbacks to the recent Impeachment of Texas federal Judge Sam Kent.

• Kent shows he won’t go away easily

• Kent action fast, Congress votes to impeach without dissent

You be the Judge.  Is Congress denying Porteous his rights under the Fifth Amendment?

• Application for testimony under immunity

• Order allowing testimony under immunity (2)

• Motions (with exhibits to follow)

Plaintiff:  Judge Thomas Porteous

• Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
• Exhibit 1
• Exhibit 2
• Exhibit 3

• Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authoritie

• Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Oposition

• Supplemental Declaration of Richard Westling

Defendant: ALAN BARON, Special Counsel, Impeachment Task Force, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, et al.

• Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

News from the Hearing

Lawyers secretly paid Judge… (11/17/09)

so I may know the outer limits of the potential claims involved in this
action, I will require State Farm to submit, in camera, a list containing the name of the insured, the address of the property, and the amount of flood insurance paid, for all SFIP claims that meet the following criteria…

Let’s just cut to the chase here and consider whether the  list of State Farm policyholder claims the Company was Ordered to provide Judge Senter was worth the paper it was written on.

Lizana’s response to State Farm (Lizana v State Farm) gives cause for concern about the integrity of the claims file produced in discovery for any given case  and even more about the integrity of the list of claims meeting Judge Senter’s criteria.

On or about February 6, 2009, Plaintiffs served discovery requests to Defendant, which contained numerous requests for information regarding Defendant’s first party property claims handling procedures, the investigation and handling of Plaintiffs’ claims, and Defendant’s data storage systems, retention policies and procedures, and communication transmittals, among other requests seeking relevant information and data.

Fast forward to November 2009.

The entire claim file for Plaintiffs’ claim is a crucial piece of evidence in this bad
faith case. The entire claim file would include all claim files, including electronic claim files kept in the various databases. Defendant has only produced portions of the Claim Service Record (CSR) for the Homeowner’s file and the Flood file, the Underwriting, and in some cases the Regional file from Birmingham. However, there are several other databases containing files that may have differing information, which would require production of all to make up the whole or entire claim file, which would allow the Plaintiffs to properly prepare their case.

It’s no surprise the eagle-eye counsel for the Lizana plaintiffs is Coast attorney Deborah Trotter who (true to form) spotted the devil in the details:

Plaintiffs have taken the deposition of Pilot Catastrophe adjuster, Curtis Hilgersom, who testified that he had a laptop and digital camera issued to him with an ID No. by State Farm. After he finished his inspections he returned the laptop, digital camera and all paper files to State Farm.

The Plaintiffs’ Claim file, printed from the CSR database and furnished by State Farm in response to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production is incomplete and contained unexplained changes and documentation. Mr. Hilgersom could not determine if he took the photographs produced by State Farm from two separate site visits, even after he determined that he only made one site visit. Had these photographs been produced in native electronic format as requested by Plaintiffs, the metadata would have disclosed this relevant information.

Counsel for State Farm offered to provide a 30(b)(6) deponent for further inquiry into how the electronic claim file was utilized and changes documented. (The deposition transcript is not yet  received from the Court Reporter—Exhibit E, Deposition Excerpts of Hilgersom, will be supplemented.)

Trotter is also plaintiff’s counsel in two other cases SLABBED is following – Lebon v State Farm and New Light Baptist Church v State Farm. In each of the three cases, Trotter has filed a similar claim-specific subpoena duces tecum to take the deposition of an IT 30(b)(6) representative.  As Trotter moves each case forward, the devil in one case pops up in the details of another, for example:

Emails produced in Marion S. Lebon and Lisa Cowand v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company have come from the State Farm department regarding mediation. These emails request movement of the Lebon electronic file from one database to another. (Exh. F, Emails produced in Marion S. Lebon and Lisa Cowand v. SFFCC).

A review and comparison of documents produced in Lebon v SFFCC, and represented as the Plaintiffs’ “underwriting file” and documents produced by State Farm in New Light Baptist Church (NLBC) v State Farm Fire & Casualty Company and represented as NLBC’s “underwriting file” show printed reports from the PDQ database in the format of screen shots in one production and not the other. (Exh. G, PDQ Reports in NLBC v SFFCC.)

Speaking of the devil, defendant State Farm is vigorously opposing Trotter’s effort.  The company has filed motions for protective orders as well as motions to quash.  In a Louisiana case, State Farm pulled out all stops – and a heavy purse – to settle a case that had an IT deposition scheduled the next day.

Judge Senter best sleep with one eye open – else the devil hiding details of the claims on his list may be buried by the time he starts looking for details.

Big football weekend here in the land of the slabbed; but, no sports channel was covering the settlement game – and one is definitely playing in Wilson v Scruggs.

Almost simultaneously with their settlement with Team Scruggs, Team Wilson filed a weak response to co-defendant Steve Patterson’s Motion to Dismiss – an obvious incentive to settle.

Apparently, it was also incentive for Eastland to stick with the playbook while co-counsel Greer went with the legal equivalent of wild Rebel and filed across-claim for Patterson that suggests there is still more to learn about the money paid Ed Peters:

Patterson’s only involvement in the circumstances surrounding this action was that he was asked by Scruggs’ representatives to find local counsel in Jackson, Mississippi, for the Wilson asbestos case. Patterson had known Attorney Ed Peters (“Peters”) for years and recommended Peters to Scruggs as local counsel. The only action taken by Patterson was introducing Scruggs and his legal team to Peters so that Peters could be the consulting local counsel in the Wilson litigation.

At no time did Patterson have any direct contact with Circuit Judge, Bobby DeLaughter, nor did he attend any meetings when Judge DeLaughter was present. Specifically, Patterson never committed any criminal act whatsoever, such as bribery or fraud, and never committed any act which would amount to general negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract or any other action of whatsoever kind which would cause, contribute to, or relate in any way to any damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Scruggs is guilty of bribing Judge DeLaughter, and defrauding the plaintiff, by and through Peters, and that those actions caused a favorable result in the Wilson case. Patterson had no involvement at all in those circumstances other than introducing Scruggs to the local counsel, Peters. Patterson received no funds, was not compensated in any way, shape or form…and was completely unaware of the possibility that Scruggs would allegedly perform any criminal act of any sort to bring potential liability upon himself and others.

Scruggs, according to plaintiff, is allegedly guilty of the crimes charged to him in regard to Judge DeLaughter and has pled guilty to some of the same. Therefore, by his own admission, he is guilty of a crime which is one of the elements requiring common law indemnity in favor of Patterson if Patterson had any vicarious responsibility.

So, sports fans, what we have here is a crime where no one accused of attempting to influence Judge DeLaughter ever said a word to the man.

Absent a smoking gun email, doesn’t the Government’s entire case rest on the word of Ed Peters? After all, neither Scruggs, nor Joey Langston, nor Balducci, nor Patterson can testify to having a conversation with DeLaughter.

…and then there’s the matter of the money paid former Hinds County District Attorney Ed Peters AKA DeLaughter’s close personal friend:

Booneville lawyer Joey Langston pleaded guilty Jan. 7 to getting money from Scruggs to try to influence DeLaughter’s decision. In his plea, Langston said he was paid $1 million from Scruggs to Peters to get a favorable ruling from the judge in a lawsuit against Scruggs for attorneys’ fees from asbestos litigation.

A similar article ups the ante to three ($3,000,000)

In the $16 million Wilson vs. Scruggs lawsuit, Dickie Scruggs’ former attorney Joey Langston admits getting $3 million to influence that case before Judge DeLaughter. Langston says Peters pocketed $1 million to convince DeLaughter to rule in Scruggs’ favor.

The total amount in play and the distribution of same was included in the criminal charges admitted to by Langston in his negotiated plea agreement with the government.

Between July 2006 and July 2007 Langston, Patterson and close personal friend of DeLaughter split $3million.

How is it then that some months later, Langston recanted with no repercussions for what amounted to lying to the government:

Richard “Dickie” Scruggs didn’t pay me what he said he would, says former Booneville attorney Joey Langston in newly filed court documents. Even so, Langston said he paid former Hinds District Attorney Edward Peters his share — $950,000 — of what they “saved” Scruggs by allegedly bribing a judge to rule for Scruggs in a legal-fees case now the object of a federal investigation and a civil lawsuit…

Langston’s affidavit says he paid Peters $1 million “even though I did not receive $3,000,000.00 from Scruggs.”

So, Langston, not Scruggs, paid Ed Peters to influence Judge DeLaughter.  Could that be what’s contained in Peters’ immunity agreement with the government that Phillip Thomas of the MS Litigation Review has been unable to obtain from the USA or the Department of Justice?

Shockingly, the government has another trick up its sleeve to stall on producing the Ed Peters immunity agreement. Taking a page out of Dean Smith’s playbook, the DOJ has gone into the four corners.

I can sue DOJ to try to get a judge to order production of the agreement, but not until the appeal is decided. I’m sure DOJ will be in a big hurry to rule on (deny) the appeal. I’m starting to see how Yossarian felt.

Is Thomas the only one who feels caught in a Catch-22 since Balducci expanded his cooperation with the government to include the attempted bribe by flattery of Judge DeLaughter?

In 1985, I went to work for an attorney who had just left a defense firm.  He opened a solo office, started doing personal injury work, but his real love was insurance law – FOR THE PEOPLE.  And that’s the type of law I was involved in for 20 years – on the Plaintiff’s side.

As I look back, I see how fortunate I was to learn a new area of the law; not just the insurance first-party property type, but the bad faith aspect of it as well.  That part amazed me and it still does.  If it did not, I would never have discovered SLABBED.

Anyway, learning that an insurance company could get punished for not “playing fairly”and have to pay for their misdeeds was much more exciting than putting together a soft tissue, PI case for a “demand package” that’s worth Five-dollars ($5.00).

As every reader of SLABBED (and non-reader residents, friends, etc.) in your region knows, there is nothing more sacred than your home.  Or your business.  Or your possessions.  All along you think you’re fine,  you’re covered because YOU’VE GOT INSURANCE!

And then (think like Emeril) BAM! here comes Katrina (nasty lady) and she wipes you out.  You make a claim and you DON’T GET PAID.  You think, maybe I didn’t fill the forms out right, let me double-check them.  No, that’s not it, let me call the adjuster and see what’s going on.  Wait now, the adjuster is not calling me back. That adjuster was all over me after the loss, but now that I think back on it, I haven’t talked to that adjuster since I gave him/her that recorded statement!  BAM again!

Now the insured sees the real meaning of INSURANCE.  It’s coverage alright – but for who?  For you when it’s agreeable to the “Company” to pay you what they want to pay you and, again, when they want to pay – IF THEY WANT TO PAY YOU.

Now it’s a real shame that the insured has to (usually) get the phone book out and find an “insurance attorney” (whom they probably did not even knew existed prior to the claim denial) and get a babysitter, take time off work, park, walk in the lawyer’s office and hire/pay them to help obtain insurance proceeds (benefits) that should have been paid out a LONG TIME AGO WITHOUT A FIGHT AND WITHOUT HAVING TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY!

After working 23 years as a legal secretary wearing many hats, SLABBED reader Shirley Heflin
is now a college senior and soon to be graduate with a degree in psychology.  SLABBED appreciates Shirley’s interest in giving the three of us a night off and her guest post in response to our standing offer to readers.

This I could never summarize – not ever, not in a million years.

Editilla Gotta Toll’ya… we toll’ya! hahaha~ I took one look at this woman and all sorts of Intuitive Bells and Whistles began popping off, the good kind, the right kind… like this time we may very well have a Real Chance for, I dare say, Change. Suffice to say, Editilla is Tickled to Bits. Buuuttt…

Here’s the deal: when President Obama finally came to town to pee down our legs and tell us it was Katrina, Editilla iced over, sadly jaded with Social Networking as a Platform for Change.

Been there, done that, and all we got are these email solicitations.  So let us hope that we will be seeing Real Plans here and not just another Fly’Paper Campaign against the last Chief Executive.

While she has Not Officially Declared Her Candidacy, opening a Twitter and Facebook Account unofficially assumes the position of publicly Bending Over and is saying to the world: “Kick Me”.  I mean, this means she’s fair game now right? There is No Crying In Politics…RIGHT? Riiiiight… Let’s Roll!

Soooo, despite Editilla’s general fondness of Women Chief Execs –and the Idea of This One in Particular– we are sorry to report there is No Information on these sites as yet, nada quiche capiche –but they will be glad to take down your offer to help! What? Help What? We already know how to Costume, how to march… but where’s the music? Where’s the Band? The Forking Beef?

That dog just won’t hunt wit’out no Game. Let’s Get Some Game On da’Table before we join your little partay ok? As our minions of Valued Gentle’rillas hit her site, we register enough for now. But, when you place your name in the pile, you will leave much more than a simple demographic, you will be leaving a Marketing Base, something a bit more usable, but with no product to speak of offered in return. Hell, even the Barkers on Bourbon will give you a little story with da’Pitch or the kids down the block will show some Tap before they Rap fo’da money, the Cinch?

Let’s hope her “Social Networking” “People” are quicker on the up-take than this, and will shortly step out of the way –so we can see what this Candidate Leslie Jacobs truly has on her mind for New Orleans before they ask us to join their 2nd Line.

I mean, you can put Lipstick on the Internet all you want…–but that don’mean you can make it squeal like a pig!

All we have here right now is the Wrapping? Where’s the Candy? T’ROW ME SOME’TIN, SIIIISSSSTAAAA! Ahem, yes, well.  But, of course we can Hope to Change that, eh, now that we know where to go to give Leslie Jacobs our Word? That’s the Ticket!

Perhaps they are waiting for us to give her some ideas? Yeah! Gentle’rillas have heard Editilla’s, a Simple 2 Step Program:
~Safe Flood Walls/Flood Safety
~Re-store a New Charity Hospital

Given what we have seen thus far from the current ya’heard of peccary, what E has called the “Clown Car” of mayoral candidates, Mrs. Jacobs can easily, definitely, even defiantly stand on her own apart from these Bozos… she has already.–but we need to see Who’dat Y’know–What Sayz Youz? ~~Let’s go tell Leslie Jacobs Right Now! Yeah! That’s da’Ticket!

We’ve confirmed Kris Carter’s comment. On behalf of Nowdy and Bam Bam we’d like to thank Mr and Mrs Bossier for sticking with this litigation to the end. While our gratitude will certainly be of little solace to them right now perhaps in time they’ll take comfort from the greater good it accomplished. We also thank Judy Guice.  The tenacity in her advocating for the Bossiers is self-evident and indicative of the fine consumer lawyer she is.

I’ll be back with some analysis a bit later on the jury.

sop

If you read A Private Matter, a Public Court, you’ll know how deeply troubled I am by the injustice in our system of justice.  I’m even more concerned after reading a comment reporting:

Unconfirmed, but I’m hearing it was a defense verdict today. No punitives, no extracontractuals.

Once again, I ask: Where is the law that prohibits Judge Walker from allowing State Farm to run out the clock and run up the tab on plaintiffs? 

In early August, the 10th in fact, SLABBED posted a timeline of Guice’s five-month effort to compel discovery in Expedite is a plaintiff’s turtle and an insurer’s hare.

Slabbed also reported Bossiers’ counsel was still fighting the discovery battle two week’s before trial – Bossier challenges State Farm’s round tuit approach to compliance with Court’s Order – Trial begins in 2 weeks!

Out of respect for the chair, or in this case the bench, I held my tongue typing finger over the most telling Order of all SLABBED reported: Judge Walker sorta sanctions St. Farm – issues parking ticket in Bossier v State Farm.

I repeat, there was no justice, kindness or humility in Judge Walker’s orders nor any excuse for his conduct of the pre-trial discovery in Bossier…Give juries the evidence needed to make just decisions. Open court so that open court is a reality and not a lofty ideal.

Remember Eastland dismantles RICO claim in Wilson v Scruggs? Well, he sure ‘nuf did – although Patsy Brumfield broke the story in the Daily Journal before I could get to my computer:

Roberts Wilson Jr.’s multi-million-dollar lawsuit against imprisoned ex-attorney Richard “Dickie” Scruggs has come to an end – it’s been settled, Wilson’s attorney, Charlie Merkel of Clarksdale tells the Daily Journal.

Wilson sued Scruggs and others, accusing them of not paying what he was owed years ago for his part in national asbestos litigation. He also claimed they owed him for using his fees to bankroll other national lawsuits, which yielded mega-fees for the attorneys involved.

One of those “others” was Scruggs co-defendant Steve Patterson and Eastland’s motion to dismiss the RICO case was written in his role as Counsel for Patterson.

oday’s revelation relates to an settlement with Scruggs, his son Zach and various companies they owned. The amount is confidential, said Merkel.

Wilson, formerly of Jackson, lives in Alabama and last summer attended the guilty-plea hearing for former Hinds circuit judge Bobby DeLaughter, who insists he was never bribed when he presided over the original Wilson v. Scruggs lawsuit in Hinds County.

DeLaughter will be sentenced this Friday; but, the North Mississippi USA has been getting some heat lately on a variety of issues -none hotter than that from Judge Biggers.    Wonder if he or Judge Davidson think the doctor’s case was the USA’s first rodeo?

Don’t know; but, I’m full of questions such as will Eastland get a thank you note for breaking this buckin’ bronco? Don’t know that either; but, but the thought reminds me of the year my daughter wanted stationery for Christmas (an envelope with money in it).

Not defending the attempted fee stripping of John Jones but Mr Jones won’t be taking anything extra from the innocent.

We find that the trial court had the discretionary authority to impose sanctions against SKG based upon the acts of a single partner that occurred in the ordinary course of business of SKG. However, we conclude that the trial court erred by finding that Richard Scruggs’s misconduct occurred in the ordinary course of SKG business.

The Sun Herald wasted no time putting up the news flash from the A/P. Glad to see the Mississippi Supreme Court is more energetic than certain lazy circuit court judges that let certain blogs write their legal rulings for them.

Richard “Dickie” Scruggs involvement in a judicial bribery scandal had nothing to do with a fees dispute involving Hurricane Katrina insurance cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court has ruled.

Alright then guys, break out the time records and divvy up the money, this foolishness has gone on long enough.

Where does Jim Hood go to reclaim his reputation?

sop